Indochinese Democratic Republic

The Indochinese Democratic Republic (Vietnamese: Cộng hòa Dân chủ Đông Dương), commonly referred to as Indochina, is a federal state in Southeast Asia comprising territory of former Laos, Vietnam and part of Cambodia. The Indochinese DR is a one-party state formed for the major part out of Vietnamese political structures and thus considered the latter his successor state. Even though several attempts at reform have been taken since the collapse of the first Soviet Union, the economic results of Indochina remain poor. The regime can only maintain itself by relying on systematic oppression and the usage of anti-imperialist propaganda. The Democratic Republic has a difficult relation with its southern neighbor, the Grand Yarphese Republic, though this only manifests itself in a lack of mutual contact.

Pre-colonial history of Indochina
The area now known as Indochina has been inhabited since Paleolithic times, and some archaeological sites purportedly date back several thousand years. Archaeologists link the beginnings of civilization in the area to the late Neolithic, Early Bronze Age, Phung Nguyen culture, which was centered in Vĩnh Phúc Province of contemporary Indochina from about 2000 to 1400 BCE. The tree different regions of the contemporary Indochinese Democratic Republic have been ruled in various compositions by subsequent dynastic kingdoms. Notable examples are the legendary Hồng Bàng Dynasty, by many considered the first Vietnamese state, and the Kingdom of Lan Xang which forms the basis of the modern day region of Laos. For more information you could check the histories of Indochina's predecessor states Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Colonial rule and the Indochina Wars
Colonial presence of France in the Indochinese region dates back to as early as 1858, when the first French troops arrived. The colonization process took about a quarter century and was completed in 1883 when the native ruling dynasty of Vietnam submitted. Resistance against the French occupation was never rooted out completely but never took off before the Second World War. When the Japanese assumed control of Indochina under the excuse of 'liberation' Hồ Chí Minh established the Việt Minh resistance movement which got support of the United States.

When the war was over, the Việt Minh opposed reoccupation by the French and demanded independence for the nations within the Indochinese colony. This sparked of the First Indochina War between France and the colonial resistance. Under the international climate of Cold War a second conflict was created. Communist North Vietnam and the South Vietnamese liberation movement Việt cộng sought to unify Vietnam and fought against the US-supported regime of Ngô Đình Diệm which was perceived as en agent of imperialism. Similar conflicts brew in Laos and Cambodia, though the Cambodian Red Khmer Movement fought against the Vietnamese communist forces too. The three nations of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia won the war(s) and established independence under authoritarian and nationalist regimes albeit communist in name.

The Indochinese Democratic Republic
With the dissolving of the Soviet Union in 1991, countries like Cuba and Vietnam suffered greatly from the changing international trade environment. The economic integration into the Soviet bloc made those countries independent of the COMECON-market which disappeared with its creator. The Vietnamese regime decided to follow the example of the Chinese People's Republic and under pressure of the IMF and the World Bank began economic and political reform. A moderate take-off was perceived but soon political instability come about. A group of radicals established the Vietnamese Liberation Army and their goal was to 'liberate' the land along the Gulf of Thailand and take it over. This resulted in the creation of the Grand Yarphese Republic in late 1994.

The Vietnamese establishment reacted divided and was ruled by chaos. Several coups were attempted by military and political leaders of diverse backgrounds. Order was restored by January 1995 when Nguyễn Đỗ is appointed president by the Vietnamese Communist Party. Đỗ rolled back the reforms and had parts of the armed forces that 'pose a treat to national harmony' eliminated. Only in southernmost Vietnam the government had lost control. Rapprochement was found to Laos, which feared the growing turmoil in the region. The CP was reformed into the Unity Party of Indochina (UPI) as the Indochinese Democratic Republic was created. This federal union came about on 2 January 1995 and is in essence an answer of its predecessor states to the instability and uncertainty they faced.

In the decade that followed the Indochinese DR assumed an international policy based on isolationism and political neutrality. A course of reforms towards market socialism was pursued even though the economic results attained remain poor. In 2011 the southern Vietnamese territory was overrun by Yarphese forces. In the mean time Indochina tried to include Cambodia into its union and restore the boundaries of colonial Indochina. The Yarphese Republic however occupied most of Cambodia and unilaterally forced an agreement onto Indochina: it lost the southern rebellious region and most of Cambodia to Yarphei. The remaining part of Cambodia was incorporated into the Indochinese DR.

Constitutional provisions
The Indochinese Democratic Republic inherited most of its political institutions of the Vietnamese state. When the union with Laos was established a new Constitution was written, the first of the Indochinese DR. Major amendments were made in 2004 and 2011, the latter being the most substantial and accommodating the political structures to the inclusion of northern Cambodia as third region in the union. Article one of the Constitution of 2011, approved after the inclusion of northern Cambodia, describes Indochina as follows:


 * The Democratic Republic of Indochina is a federal union consisting of the three regions of Vietnam, Laos and Northern Cambodia united under the sovereign Unity Party. The Unity Party represents the united people of Indochina and exercises sovereignty in their name to achieve the common good and prosperity for all.

This article includes several elements that can be paraphrased as a democratic federal republic with a one-party system. The official name of the country includes both the words 'democratic' and 'republic'. Yet Indochina is often not considered any of those two. It can hardly be called a democracy since the only party allowed to participate in elections is the Unity Party of Indochina (UPI). It is considered contradictory to include both the provision of democracy and a one-party system, but the Indochinese regime has confidence in its own take on democracy. The democratic dimension can best by captured by considering the socialist past of Vietnam and Laos and is comparable to the people's democracies in Eastern Europe under communism. The republican provision is mainly outer form too as the leader of the country, Nguyễn Đỗ ever since his appointment in 1994, holds the office of president. No real democratic or republican institutions have developed since all power ultimately resides with the Unity Party, the key feature of the system.

Indochina really is a one-party state with the UPI that functions as the backbone of the entire political system. According to the Constitution, sovereignty resides with the UPI which governs the people in the name of common good. The UPI determines who gets to run in elections for the Indochinese National Assembly, delivers the president without popular consultation and concepts the major guidelines of policy. Nonetheless the Democratic Republic is not entirely subjected to party rule: economy and judiciary have been relatively privatized in comparison to the classical soviet-style dictatorships.

Organization of the power branches
It is quite clear-cut that the Indochinese DR does not hold separate power branches. There is on the contrary a strong convergence between especially the executive and legislative level. In theory the Indochinese National Assembly, the country's parliamentary organ, is the only body to write laws and it alone determines which legislation passes. The Assembly holds moderate power and most certainly can block proposals quite successfully. It is on the other hand reliant on the UPI for its composition: the UPI determines who gets to run in elections and of course only picks members loyal to the party ideals. There has been an allowance of controlled puppet opposition in the last years though. A second limit to the parliament's power is the veto right of the president who is directly appointed by the UPI. The party officials have been trying to gently privatize the judicial and economic branches of society to counter the growing corruption on lower, regional party levels.

Next to the horizontal devision, a vertical one exists corresponding the principles of federal organization. The three regional entities - Vietnam, Laos and Northern Cambodia - have a relative autonomy in domains such as preservation of natural resources, cultural identity and language, education, etc. Yet this autonomy is limited since the regional party levels have to follow the instructions of the federal one. The regions still get their autonomy though as long as they stay loyal to those views that really matter. The federal make-up of the Democratic Republic is enshrined in the Constitution and reflected in the division of the Assembly in so-called regional chambers. For a limited list of issues, a majority of votes is to be gathered in each of the three regional chambers. This procedure remains once again a symbol since the party strictly centralizes the voting process.

For the control of the economy a special institute has been developed. This used to be the domain of the Economics Department but this administration has been 'privatized' and enjoys greater autonomy from the party than other departments. The former Economics Department is now known as the Economic Planning Administration and is responsible for implementing ánd creating economic legislation.

Policies
The UPI has moved away from orthodox marxism and has stripped its policy bare of almost all references to marxist theory. Stressing the nationalist aspects of the program more strongly has been the course of action the past decade. The influence of marxist thought can however still be seen in the aggressive stance against imperialism. Nonetheless efforts have been made to leave the soviet-like organization without fully loosing control: a attempt at the creation of market socialism has been made and party control over the judicial branch and administration have loosened. This course is pursued even though the economic results attained remain poor. The regime can only maintain itself by relying on systematic oppression and the usage of anti-imperialist propaganda. The UPI is afraid that allowing more political reform will result in anarchy and foreign nations profiting of a weak and divided Indochina.

The Indochinese DR holds an international policy based on isolationism and political neutrality too. The relations with the Grand Yarphese Republic are tensed since this southern neighbor controls large parts of Vietnam and Cambodia. Still, the UPI regime has signed a treaty respecting the loss of those territories and has made clear it will abide the provisions it agreed upon.

Institutional framework
For the control of the economy a special institute has been developed. This used to be the domain of the Economics Department but this administration has been 'privatized' and enjoys greater autonomy from the party than other departments. The former Economics Department is now known as the Economic Planning Administration (EPA) and is responsible for implementing ánd creating economic legislation. The EPA consists of an executive board of seven members that set up directives for the centrally planned industries. It determines the production quota for utility sectors like electricity or the extraction of natural resources like mining. Sectors like infrastructure, housing and transportation are also largely dependent on public investments issued by the EPA.

The EPA controls the financial branch of economy by means the the Indochinese Central Bank (ICB). The ICB is the cornerstone of a monstrous mono bank system that controls the Indochinese Dong, the national currency. The ICB maintains a policy of price control on basic resources and heavily subsidizes the food industry. The artificial low prices however pose a treat in the form of a monetary overhang and oppressed inflation rates. If the Dong is to maintain its ties to the international markets a devaluation is inevitable, yet the ICB has always postponed such drastic action which would without doubt push the country into a full-scale recession. To stimulate the industrial growth, the ECB has worked out a plan that should cope with the lack of means for further financing the system:


 * Taking into account the weak financial markets and the inability to get access to foreign capital, the ICB proposes to accumulate capital trough micro-financing local collective initiatives. The ICB would invest private savings into a nationwide investment program that allows people to finance their enterprise against low interest rates. This ought to stimulate economic growth immediately and deliver financial profit on the long run. We need to use the agricultural industry as the motor of our further industrial development. (From: the ICB 2011 Investment Plan)

The ECB proposed this as an alternative to the inflation-stimulating monetary financing it resorted to in the past. The plan is to focus on the secondary and tertiary sectors and is complemented by a privatization of the agricultural economy. Agricultural production is to be taxed in-kind and the farmers will be allowed to trade the surplus on private markets. The government will restrict its distribution of subsidized food to the poorer strata of society. Opposers of this policy program wanted to use resources to stress another problem of the Indochinese economy: the lack of innovation and technological development.

Policy history
Before 1991, Vietnam was entirely dependent on the COMECON-market and held a mostly planned economic system. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Vietnam and Laos submitted to the support by the IMF and the World Bank. Economic and political reforms lead to a moderate take-off especially in the agricultural sector. The share of industrial production and services in the GDP increased. Most reforms did manage to get a firm hold within society because in 1994 political unrest caused an economic setback. When Nguyễn Đỗ became president he turned back the reforms to assure tight control over society once again, something he deemed crucial for attaining national unity and avoiding a collapse of the regime. By the early 2000s economic stagnation had rooted out all optimism about a higher standard of living.

To spark economic growth, Đỗ pushed policy towards the stronger integration of market incentives into the socialist economic structure. The current policy is based on the experiments of market socialism which showed success in eastern Europe and China before. The economic apparatus is however still subject to high levels of government interference. Poor results remain the standard, though attempts at privatization of small agricultural enterprises have averted a shortage of food supply. The main problems with the Indochinese economy are the lack of ties with foreign markets, low living standard, small internal market, monetary overhang and oppressed inflation. Currently the UPI is divided over whether to stress capital accumulation or innovation as the motor of growth. The majority want to stimulate growth by an extensive growth model and introducing market incentives while the other side deems the closing of the 'technology gap' with other countries as highest priority.

Economic development
Indochina remains a relatively poor country with only little economic power. Some have however proposed that for a third world country with a repressive regime and state-controlled economy, the numbers are reasonably well. Estimates of the realized nominal GDP for 2011 are situated around 95 billion USD. This comes down to a per capita GDP of 1,168 USD which means an approximate three percent rise compared to previous year. The Human Development Index (HDI) was for 2010 pinned down at .472 which is a medium to low score. The HDI has increased greatly since the reforms initiated in 2004 started to be implemented. Yet in the previous decade the index had dropped below .300 which according to critics made an increase inevitable as measures were taken.

The Democratic Republic of Indochina has refuted assistance programs of the IMF and World Bank and denies access to critical NGO's which makes estimates about the development hard, especially in more remote regions. Yet migration numbers have dropped since the early 2000s which suggests that the situation has ameliorated.

Military information and technology
The military of the Indochinese Democratic Republic is in effect a military police force to control the inland population. Since the creation of the Indochinese National Forces not a single serving unit has crossed the Indochinese borders. The National Forces are land troops mainly, though there are small air force and navy divisions too. The most notable intervention by the National Forces was when several provinces rebelled against the central government in 1994. Under the command of Nguyễn Đỗ order was restored, with the exception of some southern Vietnamese regions. The Indochinese National Forces are not considered capable of striking outside the own country. President Nguyễn Đỗ has maneuvered his country in a more or less neutral way out of diplomatic conflicts and seeks to avoid an open war. The failing of the military apparatus could well mean the end of the regime and the Indochinese Democratic Republic as a state.

The biggest lack of the Indochinese National Forces is that they do not posses advanced military equipment. Besides a fair amount of light artillery and tank divisions, the Indochinese army depends on guerrilla warfare tactics and hit-and-run raids. Some international observers doubt whether Indochina can defend its urban centers against a foreign invasion at all. Nguyễn Đỗ has answered to such claims that 'the people of Indochina have been underestimated before' and pointed out that as long as a guerilla army exists, it is winning.

Cultural divides and the New Indochina
The Democratic Republic of Indochina has a wide variety of cultures of which the Vietnamese, Lao and Khmer are the most visible. There is a fair amount of cultural autonomy for the three regions and several other minorities have been recognized and protected as well. The current regime does stress the unity of the country but is very careful in dealing with the existing cultural divides. It wants to avoid an outbreak of regional national conscience and thus stimulates the image of a 'New Indochina' were cultural plurality and political unity go hand in hand. Some ethnicities originally feared that their culture would be replaced by the Vietnamese one or a newly constructed 'Indochinese' identity. While the latter surely is a noticeable goal of the country its leadership, strive between certain ethnicities has been ended by the regime.

There is a huge amount of personal freedom when it comes to religion, tradition, language, etc. The own identity does however not stand in the way of accepting the multi-ethnic political structure. The federal structure and local party branches serve to integrate the many people of Indochina. The leadership has been very cautious in not making their national project seem like a Vietnamese occupation.